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Abstract
This paper studies coalition formation under asymmetric information. An
outside party oers private payments in order to inuence the collective decision
over an unpopular reform. The willingness to accept such payments is private
information. The paper demonstrates that a supermajority coalition induces
truth-telling and secures the implementation of the decision for a price close to
the full information minimal winning coalition price. On the contrary, if the
minimal winning coalition is formed, then no revelation is possible.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the coalition formation for an unpopular reform in the
presence of private payments and private information.
I consider the following situation: a reform is introduced and needs the sup-
port of players who are going to lose from the implementation. Such players can
be compensated for their support with private payments. But the compensation
induces some additional costs: players bear private costs if they accept private
payments in case of the reform implementation. Moreover, I assume that such
costs are private information. There is an outside party which is interested in
reform approval and tries to form a coalition for this purpose. I show that,
in contrast to minimal winning coalition, in case the supermajority coalition is
formed, the full revelation of private costs is possible and the support of cheapest
players can be secured.
The labour market reform which has to be supported by at least some trade
unions could be presented as an example of such a situation. The similar case
occurs when the prime minister proposes a rather unpopular reform and needs
the support of ministers in the government and the parties in the government
coalition. The alternative interpretation can be oered by some interest group,
trying to inuence collective political decision.
In the government example, the payments can be governmental portfolios
or the implementation of other projects in which the politicians might be inter-
ested. The interest group can use illegal bribes or legal campaign contributions.
Private costs associated with private payments can be interpreted in a number
of ways. Firstly, the players can bear some "reputation" costs: politicians can
be considered corrupted by some voters, trade unions or some union members
can loose their reputation, which can have negative inuence in the future. Sec-
ondly, the costs can take a form of a private "scruple": a politician just suers
if he is associated with the undesired decision. In the lobby example there is
a risk of punishment if the lobbying activity is illegal. In this case politician
can be punished for obtaining illegal private payments. When private payments
take the form of a campaign contribution, a realistic interpretation for costs can
be the reduction in the reelection chances (Prat 2004, Prat, Puglisi and Snyder,
Jr. 2005).
The existence of costs, associated with obtaining private benets rather than
with the actual vote, is the important feature of my model . If the unpopular
reform or project are implemented, everyone associated with the decision has
to bear costs, not only the players who voted for the implementation. Such
situation indeed is possible if the supermajority coalition is formed: there is
no need for all coalition members to actually support the decision during the
voting stage, but they are still dened as coalition members and can bear costs
if they obtained the private payments from implementation.
A good example for this cost structure is the pullout process in Israel in 2005,
where some politicians did not want to be included in the coalition in order not to
be associated with the disintegration process. The following citation introduces
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the concept of the "collective responsibility" and explains the spirit of my cost
assumption:
"Worst of all is the way the politicians { government ministers, mainly {
think they can have their cake and eat it, too. They want to keep their seats
in a government that voted for the pullout, but without voicing solidarity for
its decisions. They serve in a government that elected to leave Gaza, but they
don't understand that even if they voted "no," they are partners in the decision.
Because there is a principle known as collective responsibility. Sharon's success
will be their success. Yet no one has come out in defense of Sharon - or in
defense of the decision reached by his government, to be more precise." ("Silence
of the lambs as Israel burns" Yoel Marcus, 01.07.2005 Haaretz).
A part of Sharon's government remained government members, receiving all
oce "perks", despite voting against the disintegration plan. But others con-
sidered the damage of the "collective responsibility" for their future political
carrier as too high and left the government. For example, the nancial min-
ister and Sharon's main rival in the Likud party Benjamin Netanyahu, whose
supporters considered the disintegration plan as the opposite to "success", left
the government shortly before the disintegration plan implementation. In other
words, a coalition member cannot simultaneously enjoy private payments asso-
ciated with the coalition membership and the political capital associated with
a "no" vote.
I investigate the closed voting procedure, advocated by Dal Bo (2007) and
Gruner and Felgenhauer (2008)2, where the actual vote of a politician cannot
be observed and private payments can be conditioned only on the reform im-
plementation. I do it for the two reasons. First, my cost assumptions becomes
stronger. Without the information about an actual vote, the private payment
is the only signal concerning coalition participation. Second, under open voting
procedures Dal Bo (2007) and Gruner and Felgenhauer (2008) propose mecha-
nisms which allow to inuence decision at no or very small costs3.
I consider the following mechanism which represents the simple majority
and supermajority coalition formation: the group of players (politicians) are
2Both papers belong to the recent literature that compares open and closed voting rules.
Dal Bo (2007) and Felgenhauer and Gruner (2008) found that under an open rule an outside
party can manipulate the committee decision at very small costs or even at no cost at all. As
a result both papers advocate for a closed voting procedure.
Dal Bo presents a complete information model where all committee members are to some
extent against the approval of the project desired by an interest group.
Felgenhauer and Gruner discuss the case where committee members have private infor-
mation about what might be the best policy. Moreover, they are inuenced by an external
interest group, which favors a certain policy.
3Such mechanisms obviously do not include full compensation of coalition members. There-
fore, such mechanism usually would be not robust to repeated interaction or any reputational
concerns of the coalition builder. If it is essential that the coalition members for whatever
reasons, may be not explicitly modeled, are fully compensated for their loss, then the private
information concerning their costs is crucial. In such model my results may be applied for
open voting procedure as well.
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supposed to decide about the reform implementation under the simple majority
voting rule. The player who wants to inuence the decision (the prime minister)
commits to the size of the coalition. The politicians make an announcement of
their type: their private costs of obtaining the private payments. The prime
minister forms a coalition from the players with smallest types and in the case
of reform implementation compensates them their loss from the reform itself
and private costs of coalition participation. It reminds an auction where one
buyer has to form at least a simple majority coalition of sellers and collects their
bids, committing to a coalition size. The dierence is that "sellers" do not have
to commit to their bids: the politicians can always change their mind and vote
against a reform, even if they are proposed a private payment according to their
announcement.
The main result of my paper is that if the types of players are discrete then
the truthful implementation exists under the supermajority coalition in contrast
to the minimal winning coalition. If the types are continuous, then there is no
truthful revelation under both types of coalition, but under the supermajority
coalition it can be achieved using Crawford and Sobel (1982) partition strategy.
To the best of my knowledge, supermajority coalition formation as a tool in
mechanism design is a new explanation to its existence. Usually it is a minimal
winning coalition that appears as a key prediction of various models of coalition
formation and vote buying (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Denzau and Munger 1986,
Shepsle 1974, Riker 1962). But in reality, oversized coalitions appear at least
as often as minimal winning coalitions (see discussion in Groseclose and Snyder
(1996), Diermeier et all (2002, 2003)).
The direct explanation of the supermajority existence in an uncertain envi-
ronment is intuitive: it serves to increase the probability of a desirable decision
(Koehler 1972, 1975, Riker 1962). Another possible reason is the norm of univer-
salism (Klingaman 1969, Weingast 1979). Groseclose and Snyder (1996) suggest
that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions if
there is a competition among vote buyers who move sequentially. Diermeier and
Merlo (2000) analysis accounts for surplus and minority governments in a two
periods model of the government formation and termination with a stochastic
default policy. Axelrod (1970) suggests that supermajority coalitions arise when
small, ideologically centrist parties are included to reduce the conict of interest
among parties in the government. Baron and Diermeier (2001) believe that su-
permajority coalitions form when the status quo policy is ideologically extreme.
Crombez (1996) predicts that the largest party will propose a supermajority
coalition when it holds few seats and is ideologically extreme. Carrubba and
Volden (2000) propose that supermajority coalitions come about when policy
logrolls are dicult to achieve and sustain over time. Lijphart (1984) and Sjolin
(1993) argue that supermajority coalitions are formed in order to ensure control
of the upper chamber in bicameral systems4.
This paper is also related to Tsai and Yang (2010a, 2010b). In these two
4See Carrubba and Volden (2004) for a summary of theoretical explanations for the super-
majority existence.
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papers Tsai and Yang introduce asymmetric information into the coalition for-
mation models proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (2000) respectively. The main result is that both supermajority
coalitions and minimal winning coalitions may arise in the equilibrium. This
is in contrast to the certain world in which only minimal winning coalitions
appear. But in Tsai and Yang there is no possibility of information exchange
between the players, so the incentives to form the supermajority coalition are
quite dierent from the current paper.
The paper is structured in the following way: the next section describes the
model. Section 3 discusses coalition formation under asymmetric information:
section 3.2 presents minimal winning coalition and section 3.3 investigates the
supermajority coalition. Section 4 discusses the optimal coalition size. Section
5 considers continuous types. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There is a group of n politicians who decide about the implementation of some
reform. Let n be an odd number. The decision rule is the simple majority
voting rule, so the reform is implemented if at least n+12 politicians support it.
If the reform is not implemented, a default policy takes place.
Assume that there is some player, called the prime-minister, who is inter-
ested in the implementation of the reform and has the ability to inuence the
decision by proposing private payments to the politicians. I denote the vector
of payments by t, ti  0, where ti is the payment to politician i.
2.1 Preferences
The politicians derive utility from either the implemented reform or the default
policy as well as from private payments. I assume that all politicians obtain a
utility normalized to zero, if the reform is implemented. Otherwise it is equal
to some constant p > 0. Therefore, without additional incentives, all politicians
vote against the reform.
I assume that politicians are considered to be coalition members if they
obtain private payments from the prime-minister. Then they bear some positive
costs if the reform is implemented. The politicians dier with respect to these
costs. The cost for politician i is denoted by di and is distributed independently
on the interval [dL; dH ], 0 < dL < dH , according to some distribution function
D. Moreover, I assume that di is private information and is observed only by
politician i. From now on, I refer to di as to the type of politician i. Note, that
costs are realized only if ti > 0. If ti = 0 then politician i's cost is zero.
I consider the closed voting rule, so the payments are conditioned on the
implementation of the reform and not on the individual votes. As a result, the
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utility obtained by politician i is:
Ui (di; ti) =
8<: ti   di if the reform is implemented and ti > 00 if the reform is implemented and ti = 0
p if the reform is not implemented
: (1)
I do not explicitly model the prime-minister's utility, but I assume that it
decreases in the sum of payments
P
i
ti and increases in the probability of the
reform's approval. I further assume that the value of the reform for the prime-
minister is relatively high, so she can credibly commit to large private payments.
2.2 Mechanism
There exist a number of potential options for the prime-minister, if she wants
to inuence the decision and to reduce the aggregate payments. In the case
of open voting, the prime-minister could make proposals according to Dal Bo
(2007) mechanism and trigger the reform implementation at no costs for herself.
But in the case of the closed voting it would not work.
What else could the prime-minister do? First of all, the prime-minister
can always propose the payment equal to p + dH to a simple majority. Such a
proposal will denitely guarantee the reform implementation, but it can be quite
expensive for the prime-minister. The prime-minister can also propose lower
payments to some politicians and face a certain risk of the reform rejection.
In this paper I do not try to search for the optimal strategy for the prime-
minister. I rather compare two popular coalition forms: a minimal winning
coalition (MWC) with supermajority coalition, and show that in case the su-
permajority coalition is formed, the full revelation of private costs is possible
and the support of cheapest players can be secured.
As a benchmark, let us consider the complete information case. The standard
result for close voting models is that the prime-minister forms MWC: she invites
n+1
2 politicians with the lowest types into the coalition. The payment to each
coalition member in the case of the reform implementation equalizes the utility
from the reform implementation and the coalition membership with the default
option5:
ti   di = p (2)
) ti = p+ di > 0
The proof follows direct from the observation that MWC minimizes the
aggregate payment to the politicians, given that the reform is implemented.
However, under asymmetric information the prime-minister does not know
which politicians are cheapest to buy and has to use some mechanism in order
to nd it out.
5As it is customary in the literature, I assume that if a politician is indierent, he will vote
for the reform.
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I propose the following mechanism: given the vector of announced typesed, where edi is the announced type of politician i, the prime-minister invites c,
n+1
2  c  n, politicians with the lowest announced types into the coalition and
promises to pay to coalition member j the private payment tj
tj(edj) = p+ edj (3)
in the case of the reform implementation. All other politicians are called
the opposition members and obtain zero payment. If the prime-minister is
indierent who out of several politicians is to be included into the coalition
(which happens if they report the same type), she randomizes between them. If
the politicians announce their true types, then such payments, rst, minimize
the aggregate payment to the politicians. Second, they guarantee the reform
implementation.
In this case the payment does not depend on the politician's real type but
increases in the announced type edi. Then the utility of politician i with type di
who announces type edi is
Ui

di; edi =
8<: p+
edi   di if the reform is implemented and i is a coalition member
p if the reform is not implemented
0 if the reform is implemented and i is not a coalition member
(4)
This mechanism reminds a kind of auction where the prime-minister buys
the votes from the politicians. The politicians announce for how much they are
ready to sell their vote and the prime-minister commits to choose c cheapest
ones and to pay them according to their announcements. The main dierence
is that, unlike in the usual auction, the politician does not have to commit to
his announcement: he can always vote against the reform even if he "wins" the
auction and is invited into the coalition.
2.3 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The prime-minister announces the mechanism, namely, she commits to
the number of coalition members c and payments (3). As it is traditional
in the literature, I assume that the prime-minister is able to commit to all
her announcements and payments.
2. The politicians announce their types simultaneously.
3. The mechanism is implemented: the prime-minister observes the announce-
ments and invites c politicians into the coalition.
4. The voting takes place and coalition payments (3) are paid in the case of
the reform implementation.
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As I already mentioned, the politicians' announcements do not need to be
true and the politicians cannot commit to any specic voting behavior.
I restrict the announcements to the space of feasible types. Therefore, the
feasible action of politician i at the second stage of the game is the type an-
nouncement edi (di; c) 2 [dL; dH ]. The feasible action of politician i at the voting
stage is ai

di; edi; ti; c 2 faccept; rejectg. Strategy si for player i is a sequence
of actions and the strategy prole s is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each
player.
The game is solved by backward induction. The solution concept is subgame
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Since no player can change the outcome if
a proposal is supported by more than a simple majority, I restrict attention to
the equilibria in which weakly dominated strategies are eliminated.
3 Coalition size
In this section I obtain the main result of this paper: I investigate if the mecha-
nism can be truthfully implemented depending on the size of coalition c. I start
with the MWC, then I describe the case of minimal supermajority coalition with
n+3
2 coalition members. Finally, I consider the general case of supermajority
coalition with c  n+32 .
3.1 Voting
In this section I introduce some lemmas which describe the voting behavior of
politicians at the last stage of the game and which will be helpful throughout
the paper:
Lemma 1 All opposition members vote against the reform.
The proof follows directly from the assumption that 0 < p.
From Lemma 1 I obtain the following result:
Corollary 1 If the coalition is a minority coalition, the reform is never
implemented.
Thus, the prime-minister never forms a minority coalition.
Lemma 2 If ti di  p the coalition member votes for the reform, otherwise
he votes against the reform.
The proof follows directly from (1).
3.2 Minimal winning coalition
In this section I investigate what happens when the prime-minister forms the
MWC. Namely, the prime-minister observes the vector of announcements ed and
proposes membership in the coalition to n+12 players with minimal announce-
ments.
The rst result is that if the prime-minister forms the MWC, she cannot
induce the truth-telling announcement:
Proposition 1 Under the MWC, there are no truthful announcements.
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Proof. Suppose, contrary to proposition, that all politicians make truthful
announcements if c = n+12 . Consider now the politician with true type dH . He
either announces his true type or he can deviate and make an announcementedi < dH . If he is a coalition member, his minimal utility is p, regardless of his
announcement. This is because all coalition members are pivotal, hence, if any
coalition member obtains less than p as a result of the reform implementation,
he can always induce the reform rejection and obtain p as default payment.
If he is an opposition member, his payment is 0 because the reform is always
implemented. It follows that he will always announce to be dL type in order to
increase his chances to be in the coalition and his announcement will never be
truthful.
Since the MWC is a key prediction of various models for coalition formation,
it may be interesting to investigate what announcements are made if the prime-
minister tries to form the MWC:
Proposition 2 If the prime-minister forms the MWC and proposes pay-
ments according to (3), there are two possibilities:
(i) all players announce edL. If politicians' types are continuous, it is a unique
announcement.
(ii) If politicians' types are discrete, then there may exist type d so that all
politicians with true type di < d
 announce edi > di and all politicians with true
type di  dannounce edL.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition implies an even stronger result than just lack of a truthful
announcement: building MWC, the prime-minister cannot even sort politicians
according to their types and induce a monotonic announcement where for each
two politicians, i and j : edi  edj , di  dj : (5)
3.3 Supermajority coalition
In this section I show that truthful implementation is possible if the prime-
minister forms the supermajority coalition. In this model, the supermajority
comprises n+32 or more politicians. I consider the case of
n+3
2 coalition members,
the "minimal" supermajority coalition and I discuss larger coalitions in the next
section. Therefore, the prime-minister observes the vector of announcements ed
and proposes membership in the coalition to n+32 players with the minimal
announcements. I assume, for simplicity, that there are only two possible types
of politicians fdL; dHg and the probability of type dH is h. The result is easily
extended to an arbitrary number of discrete types, see remark in the end of the
section. Private payments to coalition members are then as follows
ti(edH) = p+ dH ; (6)
ti(edL) = p+ dL: (7)
9
The important feature of a supermajority coalition and the main dierence
from the MWC is that no coalition member is pivotal. If all but one coalition
member j announce their true type, then the reform is implemented regardless
of the announcement, the private payment and the voting behavior of j. Hence,
if a single player deviates from the truthful announcement strategy, his utility
depends only on his announced type, true type and coalition status, but not on
his voting behavior.
The following proposition presents the main result of the paper:
Proposition 3 If the prime-minister forms a supermajority coalition with
c = n+32 , the mechanism is truthfully implemented if
1  1
a (n; h)

p  dH   dL  (a (n; h)  1) p (8)
where
a (n; h) 
1 Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
:
Proof. Suppose that all politicians announce their true types. If player i is of
type dL and he announces his true type, then his expected utility is:
EUi

dL; edL = p+ n 1X
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n 1 k (1  h)k

n+ 3
2 (k + 1)
  1

p;
(9)
and if he deviates and announces type dH , then his expected utility is:
EUi

dL; edH = n+12X
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+ 3  2k
2 (n  k) (p+ dH   dL) :
(10)
If player i is of type dH and he announces his true type, his expected utility is
EUi

dH ; edH = n+12X
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+ 3  2k
2 (n  k) p: (11)
If he deviates
EUi

dH ; edL = (p+ dL   dH)+ (12)
n 1X
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

n+ 3
2 (k + 1)
  1

(p+ dL   dH) :
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Then both types of politicians make a truthful announcements if
Ui

dL; edL  Ui dL; edH ; (13)
Ui

dH ; edH  Ui dH ; edL ; (14)
or26641 
Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
  1
3775 p+ dL  dH ;
(15)26641 
Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
1 Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

3775 p+ dL  dH :
(16)
One can rewrite these conditions as
1  1
a (n; h)

p  dH   dL  (a (n; h)  1) p (17)
where
a (n; h) 
1 Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
:
Moreover, for a relevant parameters range (n > 3; 0 < h < 1; p > 0), it can be
shown that
(a (n; h)  1) p >

1  1
a (n; h)

p: (18)
Therefore, there are always dH and dL so that conditions (15) and (16) are
satised.
This proposition shows that the truthful implementation exists when the
dierence between dH and dL is non negligible, but not extreme. The incentive
to deviate for type dL is to increase the private payment in case of coalition
membership, at the expense of the probability of coalition membership. If the
dierence between dH and dL is too large, type dL deviates. Type dH may
deviate in order to increase the coalition membership probability at the expense
of the private payment in case of coalition membership. He will deviate if the
dierence dH and dL is too small.
For example, for n = 7, h = 0:5 and p = 1, both types make truthful
announcements if the following conditions are satised:
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: 542 14 < dH   dL < 1: 184 1:
The following results show how the change in the parameters p, n and h
inuences the likeliness of the implementation:
Corollary 2 The range of parameters dH and dL, for which both types make
truthful announcements, increases in p.
Proof. From (15) and (16) it follows that the range of parameters dH and dL,
for which both types make truthful announcements, increases in
(a (n; h)  1) 

1  1
a (n; h)

p:
(a (n; h)  1) 

1  1a(n;h)

> 0, therefore it increases in p.
This corollary states that the higher the utility from the default policy is,
the higher is the chance that the prime-minister can implement the mechanism.
The conditions under which the implementation exists are too complicated to
investigate analytically, but numerical simulations provide the following results:
Corollary 3 The range of parameters dH and dL, for which the implemen-
tation exists increases with n .
This result is represented in Figure 1. Assume that p = 1 and h = 0:5.
The upper line corresponds to the LHS of condition (15) and the lower line to
the LHS of condition (16). Therefore, the truth-telling equilibrium exists if the
value of dH   dL is between these two lines. With an increase in n the bounds
on dH   dL, implied by conditions (15) and (16), relax considerably upwards
and tighten slightly downwards. The rst eect is dominant, so the total eect
is an increase of the parameter range for which the implementation exists.
Figure 1
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This result seems counter-intuitive, because it is usually more expensive to
buy the majority in a large decision body. But buying the winning coalition
under truth-telling in a large decision body can still be cheaper for the prime-
minister than dealing with asymmetric information in a small decision body.
Furthermore, this result contradicts the famous Condorcet's jury theorem which
states that the delegation of a decision to a bigger committee yields better
results.
Remark 1 It is easy to extend this model for more than two types. Like
in a two types case, the implementation exists if the distance between types is
not too large and not too small. But the number of the conditions to be satised
increases as well: for the case of k types, k(k   1) conditions, similar to (15)
and (16) have to be satised.
4 Supermajority size
In the previous section I analyzed the minimal supermajority: simple majority
plus one politician. In this section I investigate how many coalition members
the prime-minister should include into the coalition. Including an additional
member into the coalition is costly for the prime-minister, and ceteris paribus
she will prefer the "minimal" supermajority, with n+32 members. But one also
has to consider the parameter restrictions under which the truth-telling exists.
If they change, it can be the case that the supermajority with more than n+32
members is preferable.
Assume that prime-minister commits to include n > c  n+52 politicians into
the coalition. Suppose that all politicians announce their true type.
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Then the politician with type dL announces his true type if the following
condition is satised:
0BB@1 +
Pn 1
k=c
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n 1 k (1  h)k

c
(k+1)   1

Pc 1
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k c k(n k)
  1
1CCA p  dH   dL
(19)
The politician with type dH announces his true type if the following condition
is satised:0BB@1 
Pc 1
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k c k(n k)
1 +
Pn 1
k=c
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

c
(k+1)   1

1CCA p  dH   dL
(20)
Assume that n = 51. Conditions (19) and (20) are represented in Figure 2.
The upper line corresponds to the LHS of condition (19) and the lower line to
the LHS of condition (20). Therefore, the truth-telling equilibrium exists if the
value of dH   dL is between these two lines.
Figure 2
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This example shows that big supermajority can emerge. This will occur if
the parameters are such that the truth-telling does not occurs for n+32 -members
coalition, but is possible for larger coalitions. In this particular example it
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happens if dH   dL < 1. Inviting additional players into the coalition is costly
for the prime-minister, but it can still be protable, compared to the situation
when the truth-telling cannot be achieved.
Summarizing, it is important to note again that the optimal size of coalition
would depend on the exact preferences of the prime-minister and other model
parameters. It could be that in a case where truth-telling coalition is very
expensive, which happens if it is signicantly larger than a minimal one, the
prime-minister may prefer some other strategy. For example she can propose
p+ dH to a simple majority.
Finally, note that:
Remark 2 If all players are coalition members, they will announce the
highest type. Therefore, there will be no truth-telling in this case.
5 Continuous distribution
In this section I consider continuous types. I assume that di is distributed
independently on the interval [dL; dH ]. I show that politicians do not announce
their true types, even if a supermajority is formed.
The intuition for the non-existence of truthful announcements is that high
type players expect that they will not be in the coalition with a high probability.
Moreover, the proposal will always be accepted if all players announce their
true types. Hence, the expected utility of the players with high types is close to
zero. This means that it will be protable for such players to deviate from the
truthful announcement and to announce a lower type. Opposite to a discrete
case when the announcement of a lower type implies a considerable change in
the coalition payment (from p to p + dL   dH), if the types are continuous
there is always announcement ed < dH so that deviation is protable. Two main
dierences between discrete and continuous types explain these results. If the
types are discrete, rst, the probability of the coalition participation does not
go to zero even if the true type is high. Second, the politician cannot announce
the arbitrary type di   ", he is limited to feasible types. More formally:
Proposition 4 There is no truth-telling under the supermajority coalition,
if the types are continuous.
Proof. Assume, contrary to the proposition, that all players announce their
true types and the prime-minister forms supermajority.
Consider player i: if he announces his true type, his expected utility is:
EUi (di; di) = Pi(di; d i)  p+ (1  Pi(di; d i))  0; (21)
where Pi(di; d i) is the probability that player i is a coalition member, which
is a weakly negative function of i's announcement.
If a player deviates and announces di  ", " > 0; then his expected utility is:
EUi

di; edi = Pi(di "; d i)(p+ (di   ")  di)+(1  Pi(di   "; d i))0 (22)
= Pi(di   "; d i)  (p  ") :
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If a player with type dH announces his true type, then the probability that
he is in the coalition, Pi(dH ; d i), is equal to zero. Hence, his expected utility
is zero as well. Therefore, there always exists such " that
Pi(dH   "; d i)  (p  ") > 0: (23)
As a result, the player with true type dH never announces his true type and
truth-telling cannot be the equilibrium strategy.
This result follows logically from the truthful implementation existence con-
ditions (15) and (16): if the types are continuous, they can never be satised
and the prime-minister cannot induce the truth-telling.
In order to deal with nonexistence of the truth-telling, the prime-minister
can discretize the announcements. Namely, she can adopt similar to the Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982) the partition strategy. Then the prime-minister divides
announcements space into intervals, asks politicians to announce in what inter-
vals they are, while proposing the private payments equal to the higher endpoint
of the interval. The existence of a truthful announcement in Crawford Sobel
type equilibrium for this model can easily be shown if the endpoints of intervals
satisfy the conditions similar to condition (17).
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of inuence over the group decision under asym-
metric information. I considered secret voting, so that private payments can be
conditioned only on the reform implementation. The politician bears costs if
he is associated with the reform via private payments, regardless of his actual
vote.
In this paper I investigate the formation of the supermajority coalition under
private information. By forming supermajority coalition the prime-minister can
induce the politicians to reveal their true types, if the type space is discrete.
This leads to guaranteed implementation of a generally undesired reform at a
cost close to that of the complete information MWC.
An additional interesting result follows: with an increase in the number of
politicians, truthful implementation is more likely to exist. This result is tested
and found to have strong support in Carrubba and Volden (2004). Carrubba and
Volden (2004) predict that coalitions are more likely to be oversized when the
number and diversity of actors in a legislative chamber is greater. In order to test
this predictions they use the number of actors in a legislative chamber measured
by the number of seats and the number of parties. They state that coalitions
will be more oversized in legislative chambers comprised of more decisive actors.
The truthful implementation exists already for the minimal supermajority:
simple majority plus one politician. A bigger coalition can be formed by the
prime-minister in spite of the increase in the coalition cost: introducing ad-
ditional members into the coalition leads to the existence of the truth-telling
equilibrium for a broader range of parameters.
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If the types are continuous, then there is no truthful implementation. But
this problem can be partially solved with Crawford and Sobel (1982) partition
strategy.
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7 Appendix Proof of Proposition 2
Note that at the last stage of the game all politicians vote according to Lemmas
1 and 2. Consider politician i, dL  di  dH . If politician i is an opposition
member, his utility is 0 in the case of reform implementation and p in the case
of reform rejection, regardless of his announcement and the announcement of
any other player. According to Lemma 1, he always votes against the reform.
If politician i is a coalition member, his minimal utility is p. This is because
all coalition members are pivotal, hence, if politician i obtains less than p as a
result of the reform implementation, he can always induce the reform rejection
and obtains p as a default payment. Then it follows from (utility under asym-
metric information), that all announcements edi  di secure the same utility
for coalition member i. Moreover, announcement edi = edL weakly maximizes
the chances to be in the coalition. Thus, in any equilibrium each politician i
announces either edi = edL or edi > di. Hence, a player with true type dH always
announces edL.
Player i, given the expected types and the actions of the other players, faces
the following problem: if he announces edi > di then his expected utility is
EUi
edi; di; ed i; d i = 1  Pc edi; ed ipo ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p+
Pc
edi; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p (24)
s:t: edi > di
where ed i is the announcements of all other players, Pc edi; ed i is the prob-
ability that player i is a coalition member, pc
ed i; d i is the probability
of a reform's implementation, given that player i is a coalition member and
po
ed i; d i is the probability of a reform's implementation given that player
i is an opposition member. Note that if player i is a coalition member, he al-
ways supports the reform and if he is an opposition member he votes against
it. Hence, the probabilities of the reform's implementation pc
ed i; d i and
po
ed i; d i depend only on actions of other players.
If player i announces edL, then his expected utility is as follows:
EUi
edL; ed i; d i = Pc edL; ed i p+ (25)
1  Pc
edL; ed ipo ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p
Note that if player i is a coalition member, then the reform is not implemented,
because player i votes against it.
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Player i maximizes his expected utility over edi, given di and the announce-
ments of the other players. Note, rst, that if the player announces edL then his
expected utility does not depend on his true type. Secondly, if the player is an
opposition member, his expected utility does not depend on his announcement.
Thus I can denote the opposition member's expected utility as
C
ed i; d i  po ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p (26)
Player i announces edi > di if and only if
EUi
edi; di; ed i; d i > EUi edL; ed i; d i, (27)
Pc
edi; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p Pc dL; ed i p+
+

Pc

dL; ed i  Pc edi; ed iC ed i; d i > 0 (28)
The probability to be a coalition member weakly decreases in the announce-
ment. Hence Pc

dL; ed i > Pc edi; ed i, and the third term in inequality (28)
is positive. Therefore, it is enough to prove that the rst two terms are positive
in order to show that politician i announces edi > di:
Pc
edi; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p Pc dL; ed i p > 0
(29)
) EUi
edi; di; ed i; d i > EUi edL; ed i; d i : (30)
Consider two types di1 > di2. Suppose that for di1 the optimal announce-
ment is edi > di1:
EUi
edi; di1; ed i; d i > EUi edL; ed i; d i : (31)
Then, edi > di1 > di2 and
Pc
edi; ed i pc ed i; d ip+ edi   di1 < Pc edi; ed i pc ed i; d ip+ edi   di2 :
(32)
Together with (11) it implies
EUi
edi; di1; ed i; d i < EUi edi; di2; ed i; d i (33)
) EUi
edi; di2 > EUi edL; ed i; d i
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Hence, if for true type di2, di2 > di1; the player announces edi > di2, then for
true type di1 the announcement is also higher than the true type: edi > di1.
Taking into account that a player with true type dH always announces edL, I
obtain that there are only two possible equilibrium announcement strategies for
player i:
(a) player i always announces edL regardless of his true type.
(b) there is type d such that player i announces edi > di 8di < d and edL
otherwise.
The next step is to show that there is an equilibrium where all politicians
follow the strategy (a) and announce edL. If the reform is rejected each player
obtains p. If the reform is accepted, all coalition members obtain p and the
opposition members zero. If one player deviates and announces edi > dL, he
stays in opposition. As a result, he obtains a lower payment in the case of
reform acceptance and is indierent in the case of reform rejection. Hence, all
players will announce edL.
Now I shall argue for discrete types, for some type distributions, there is
an equilibrium where all players follow strategy (b). it is enough to show one
example where it is true. Assume that there are only two types, dH and dL, and
three players. The probability for type dH is 0.5. Suppose that 0:5p+dL < dH .
Then there is an equilibrium where the players of type dL announce edH and all
players of type dH announce edL.
The last step is to show that if the type/announcement space is continues,
then there is no equilibrium where all players follow strategy (b).
Assume that all players follow strategy (b) and announce edi > di 8di < d.
Consider the incentives of player j with true type very close to d. According to
strategy (b) he announces edj > dj . Such player expects that his announcement
is a maximal among all other announcements. Then the expected probability
that he is a coalition member is very close to zero. If politician j is an opposition
member, his utility is 0 in the case of reform implementation and p in the case
of reform rejection. If politician j is a coalition member, his minimal utility is
p. Then, for all edj > dj , there always exists " such that

po
ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p < 1  Pc edi   "; ed i1  po ed i; d i p+
+Pc
edi   "; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   "  di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p
) EUi
edj ; dj . d; ed i; d i < EUi edj   "; dj ; di; ed i; d i :
Therefore, player j deviates and announces edj   " in order to improve his
chances to be in the coalition. As a result, strategy (b) cannot be the equi-
librium one. Hence, if the type/announcement space is continuous, the unique
equilibrium is that all politicians announce edL.
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